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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

No. 14113

RONALD JOE MINNISH,
Defendant-Appellant.

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE

Ronald Joe Minnish was charged in a criminal
proceeding by the State of Utah with the crime of
Murder in the Second Degree pursuant to Section 76-5-203,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, 1973.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT

On May 14, 1975, Ronald Joe Minnish, was found
guilty of Murder in the Second Degree as charged in the
Information by a jury in the District Court of the Third
Judicial District in and for Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, the Honorable Bryant H. Croft presiding.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Appellant seeks an Order of this Court reversing
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the Judgment rendered by the Trial Court and a ruling
remanding the case to the Trial Court for re-trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

On December 13, 1974 at about 10:00 P.M.
Lynn Steven Pearson was shot in an altercation at the
Indigo Lounge in Salt Lake City, Utah.

He died the

next day as a result of that gunshot wound,*
The Appellant, Ronald Joe Minnish, was charged
with second degree murder for the death of Lynn Steven
Pearson, and tried before a jury.
At the trial, evidence was introduced that the
Appellant arried at the Indigo Lounge at around 3:00 P.M.
on the afternoon of December 13, 1974.(T (2)102) From the
time of the Appellant's arrival until about 7:00 P.M. the
Appellant consumed a substantial quantity of alcoholic
beverages. (T(2)17,40,104)

At around 7:00 P.M. that even-

ing, the Appellant began playing "pinball" at the lounge.
(T92)19)

At around 8:30 P.M. the victim, Lynn Steven Pearson,

an acquaintance of the Appellant, entered the lounge.

Both

the Appellant and the victim played "pinball" and drank
alcoholic beverages until about 9:30 P.M.
sat down together at the bar and talked.

At that time, they
(T92)21)

* T(l) indicates transcript of first day, T(2)indicates
transcript of second day, T(3) indicates transcript of
third day.
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The evidence introduced by the State indicated
that while they were sitting at the bar both individuals
may have spoken in loud voices. (T(l)22) (T(l)27)

The

Appellant, when he took the stand, recalled that they
were not arguing, but were merely discussing professional
boKing and other topics.

(T92)107)(T(l)27)

The Appellant got up from the booth, put on his
coat, and left the lounge.

Then within a few minutes the

victim also left the lounge. (T(l)27)

The Appellant testified

that he was leaving the lounge to go to a friend's home.
(T(2)109)
Outside, in front of the lounge, the victim, Lynn
Pearson and the Appellant talked for a few moments. (T(2)29)
Then Pearson hit the Appellant in the face and the Appellant
fell to the ground.

While the Appellant was on the ground,

Pearson kicked him in the stomach.

(T(l)30)

Lynn Pearson then returned to the lounge.

The

Appellant walked over to his truck which was in the parking
lot.

The Appellant by all accounts of the incident was

bleeding profusely from the mouth and nose as a result of
the blows which were struck.

(T(l)68) (T(l)43)

Lynn Pearson came back into the bar and told Fred
Manning a patron of the lounge, that he had hit the Appellant
hard and had hurt him.

(T(2)26)

He went outside again and

talked to the Appellant while the Appellant was standing
next to his truck.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The Appellant at this time took his .38 caliber
revolver from his truck. (t(2)lll)

The Appellant testified

(

that he did so in order to defend himself from Pearson.
(T(2)lll)

He testified that he went back into the lounge

to call his girl friend for help and to get cleaned up.
(T(2)lll)

(

He testified that the victim said to him that

"looks like a person is just going to have to kick the
shit out of you and just kill you and get it done with."
(T(2)lll)
Inside the bar, the Appellant entered the bar
and approached Pearson.(T(l)34) The testimony indicated
that Pearson said to the Appellant, "Well, I went outside
and showed you that I wasn't afraid of you."

"What do
i

you want me to do now."

(T(l) 34)

The Appellant pulled

the revolver out of his pocket and pointed it in the direction
of the victim.

(T(l) 35)

Pearson then picked up a nearby

metal bar stool and threw it at the Appellant, striking
him in the chest. (T(l) 35, 47 T(2) 34)

Then Fred Manning,

a friend of Pearsons, grabbed the arm of the Appellant, in which
the Appellant was holding the gun.

(T(2)59

After a brief

struggle, Fred Manning was thrown to the side and the gun
was discharged, striking the victim in the chest. (T(l) 36,
(T(2) 36).
The Appellant then left the lounge and got into
his truck.

At about 10:30 P.M. that evening he was pulled

over and arrested while driving west bound on 3500 South.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The arresting officer testified that the Appellant
was having difficulty driving and was disoriented and
confused when he got out of the car.

(T(2)2)

Evidence

was introduced by defendant that the Appellant had a
blood alcohol content of .19 percent by weight at
1:05 A.M. on the 14th day of December.

(T(2)98)

The

Appellant testified that he was extremely intoxicated
and had trouble recalling clearly the incidents that
had taken place on that evening. (T(2)110)

The Appellant

introduced expert testimony of Dr. Stewart C. Harvey, who
testified at length concerning the effects of great
quantities of alcohol as had been consumed by the
Appellant on the emotional mental state of a person.
(T(3) 1 to 21).
I.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR
IN EXCLUDING ALL EVIDENCE OF THE CHARACTER OF THE
VICTIM AS TO HIS PROPENSITY FOR VIOLENCE AND AGGRESSIVENESS.
Counsel for the Appellant in the opening
statement to the jury stated that the evidence would
show that about one year prior to the incident for
which the Appellant was charged, the victim, Lynn
Pearson was involved in another similar altercation
at the same lounge.

This evidence would show that in

this prior altercation the victim, Lynn Pearson, was the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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aggressor.
Before calling the defense witnesses necessary
to establish this prior incident, as well as several
other witnesses to other prior incidents, a Motion was
made by the State to exclude this evidence.

The attorney

for the Appellant then made a proffer for the purpose
of perserving a record which indicated that the defense
would call a Mr. Tom Osborn who would testify that the
victim had a year before the incident intentionally
struck and knocked another person to the ground. (T(2)86)
The evidence would show that this altercation had taken
place at the Indigo Lounge and the attack occurred
without any provocation by the victim.

(T(2)86)

The Trial Court ruled that this evidence Wets
inadmissible.

The Court stated that "the fact that a

man had a fight a year prior to this particular shooting,
with somebody who had no connection at all with a
shooting, unknown to the defendant, is not proper evidence.
(T(2) at 95)
The evidence offered by the Appellant was material
and probative in relation to several important issues in
the case.

First, the evidence introduced by defendant

indicated that there may have been communicated to the
defendant by the victim that the victim intended to kill
the Appellant.

(See e.g. T(3)25, T(2)lll)

Evidence of

the propensity of the victim for violence and aggressiveness
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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would corroborate the defendant's evidence that he was
justified in resorting to the use of force in self-defense.
Secondly, the evidence would be material and relevant to
prove the defendant's contention that the victim was the
aggressor and not the defendant and that after the
initial assault on the defendant by the victim, the victim
continued to be the aggressor in the situation.
The general rule is outlined and annotated in
1
1 ALR 3d 571
at Section 8 which states:
" . . . it has generally been held that
evidence of the turbulent character of
the deceased or party assaulted is
admissible in a trial for homicide or
assault or tending to corroborate
testimony of the accused as to the
circumstances of the conflict, whether
the accused had knowledge of such
character or not, (emphasis added)
This rule was applied in State v. Griffin, 99
Ariz. 43, 406 P. 2d 397 (1965).

In that case, the

defendant in the course of the trial had raised the issue
of self-defense and attempted to present evidence of the
victim's reputation for the character traits of belligerance
and quarrelsomeness, which the trial court had excluded.
The Arizona Supreme Court held that where the issue of
self defense is raised, evidence of the reputation of the
deceased for aggressiveness and belligerance while intoxicated is admissible even where such character traits are

1. 1 ALR 3d 571 (1965) , supplementing 64 ALR 1029 (1929)
and cases cited therein.
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uncommunicated to the defendant.

The Court quoted jL

Wigmore on Evidence, Section 63 which states:
"When the issue of self-defense is
made in a trial for homicide and then
a controversy occurswhether the deceased was the agressor, ones persuasion
will be more or less affected by the
character of the deceased; it may throw
much light on the probabilities of the
deceased's action. . . [The] additional
element of communication is unnecessary
for the question is what the deceased
probably did, not what the defendant
probably thought he was going to do.
The inquiry is one of objective occurance, not subjective belief."
See also the leading case of Evans v. United States,
277 F. 2d 354, 1 ALR 3d 566 (D.C. Cir. 1960) and
Jones on Evidence, 6th Edition, Section 4:40 (1972).
The position taken by Professor Wigmore as
to the type of evidence was cited and approved by the
Utah Supreme Court in the case of State v. Mares, 113
Utah 225, 192 P. 2d 861 (Utah 1948).

The defendant

introduced evidence on the issue of self-defense including
the deceased's propensity to become hostile and aggressive.
The Supreme Court held that the State could offer evidence
of the victim's character^ and reputation for peacefulness.
The Court said that the principle involved with this
type of evidence is "what did the deceased probably do?"
Evidence of the probability of the deceased having acted
consistent with this character at the time of the shooting
was found by the Court to be relevant and admissible.

This

decision applying the State's correlative right to introduce
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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testimony of the deceased's good character establishs
that Utah follows the general rule.

An example of the

application of the general rule to facts similar to those
at issue in the present case is Cole v. State, 193 So. 2d
47 (Fla. 1966).

In Cole, the shooting took place in a

bar where the victim, with a knife in his hand, had gone
over to where the defendant was sitting and stopped the
defendant.

After the victim had retreated ten to twelve feet

the defendant fired a shot that struck the victim in the
stomach and killed him.

The defendant's attorney attempted

to introduce evidence of the fact that the decedent had a
record for knifings and was a violent person.

The trial

court excluded this proffered evidence because the defendant
was not shown to be aware or have any knowledge of the incidents.
The Florida Supreme Court reversed, holding that the evidence
was admissible even though uncommunicated to the defendant
because the proffered testimony as to the violent and
dangerous character of the defendant was admissible to explain
or give significance to the conduct of the deceased in order
to determine the validity of the issue of self defense.
Since the character of the deceased for turbulence
and violence is admissible and relevant, the general rule
allows such character to be proven by the use of particular
instances of violence, such as that proffered by the
defendant in the instant
the rule:

case.

As Professor Wigmore states
^:

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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2
"When the turbulent character of the deceased
in a prosecution for homicide is relevant. . .,
there is no substantial reason against
evidencing the character by particular instances
of violent or quarrelsome conduct,
Wigmore also,points out in his treatise the important
distinction that the prohibitory consideration applicable
to a criminal defendant's character have little or no
force as a reason for excluding this evidence when the person
whose character is at issue is not a party.

In Dempsey v.

State, 266 S. W. 2d 875 (Tex. Ct. Crim. Appls. 1954) the
Texas court held that specific acts of violence offered
for the purpose of showing that the deceased was in fact
the agressor are admissible without the necessity of proving
that the defendant had any knowledge of those specific acts.
Under Rule 46 of the Utah Rules of Evidence
effective July 1, 1971;
"When a person's character or trait
of his character is in issue, it may
be proved by testimony in the form of
opinion evidence of reputation, or
evidence of specific instances of the
persons conduct, subject, however, to
the limitations of Rules 47 and 48.

-

Rule 47 of the Utah Rules of Evidence states:
"Subject to Rule 48, when a person's
character is relevant as tending to
prove his conduct on a specific occasion
such trait may be proved in the same
manner as provided by Rule 46, except

2. Vol. 1 Wigmore on Evidence (1940) and supp. 1975)
Section 198; Character of the Deceased, in homicide, from
Particular Acts of Violence (page 676). See also, Jones
on Evidence, 6th Ed., Section 4:43 (1972).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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that (a) evidence of specific instances
of conduct other than evidence of conviction of a crime which tends to prove
the trait to be bad shall be inadmissible. . M
Rules 47 and 48 like the general rule provide that
character in issue may be proved by evidence of specific
instances of conduct.

The limitation of Rule 48 on evidence

of specific instances of conduct which tend to prove the trait
to be bad is designed to exclude evidence that has probative
value only to circumstantially show that the person against
whom it is offered did not have a good character.

Jones on

Evidence, 6th Edition/ Section 4:44 and 4:43, page 472.
(See footnote 18).
The effect of the combination of these rules
is similar to Rule 405 of the Federal Rules of Evidence
which allows evidence of character to be proved in any event
by reputation testimony but allow specific acts of misconduct
only in cases where a trait of character is an essential
3
element of a charge or defense.
When the character of the
accused is not directly in issue, as it was in the present
case, and the evidence of specific acts of misconduct are
admitted only for the purpose of tending to prove the bad
character of the person , such evidence would be inadmissible.
Therefore, the Appellant submits that the Trial
Court's exclusion of this evidence was prejudicial error and
the conviction should be reversed and a new trial ordered.

3. See McCormick on Evidence, 2nd Edition, by Edward Cleary
(1972) Chp. 17, Sec. 188, page 445.
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II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY

'

AS TO THE CRIME OF SECOND DEGREE MURDER.
The defendant was charged under three different
theories of Second Degree Murder.

He was charged in the

Information of having committed the offense under any
of the following circumstances:
^

(a) Knowingly or intentionally having caused
the death of another;
(b) Intending to cause serious bodily injury
to another, he committed an act clearly
dangerous to human life which caused the
death of the victim; or,
(c) Acting under circumstances evidencing
a^depraved indiffereance to human life, he
recklessly engaged in conduct which created
a grave risk of death to another and caused
the death of the victim. (R. 15)

i

<

Counsel for the Appellant, at the close of the
State's case in chief, made a Motion to that subsection
(c) of the Information based on Utah Code Annotated 76-5-203
(c) should have been stricken because this theory was not supported
by any reasonable interpretation of the evidence. (T(2)78).
The Trial Court denied this Motion after taking the motion

^

under advisement and instructed the jury as to this theory.
(See Instruction No. 14 and No. 15, R. 52, R. 54). The Counsel
for the Appellant objected to the instruction of the jury on this
theory of Second Degree Murder.

j

(T(3)30).

Utah Code Annotated 76-5-203 (c) (Amended 1973) states
that criminal homicide constitutes murder in the second degree
if the actor:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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|

(c) acting under circumstances evidencing
a depraved indifference to human life, he
recklessly engaged in conduct which created
. a grave risk of death to another and thereby
causes the death of another. . . •
In State v.

Russell, 106 Utah 116, 145 P. 2d

1003 (1944), this Court explained the scope of the section of the
former first degree murder statute that is similar to the
present section at issue in the case of the Appellant.
Utah Code Annotated 76-30-3 (repealed 1973) stated "every
murder perpetrated by any act greatly dangerous to the lives
of others and evidencing a depraved mind, regardless of human
life, is murder in the first degree."

In Russell, this Court

said that this section requires an act which is also dangerous to
other persons and not directed at any one person in particular.
The Court said that this type of statutory language is designed
to cover the situation where the defendant's acts are calculated
to put the lives of many persons generally and indiscriminately
in jeopardy.

The scope of this type of provision was also

explained in State v. Weddle, 29 Utah 2d 464, 511 P. 2d 733
(1973) where the Court found that the evidence must reveal an
act directed at other persons generally.
The Appellant submits that the evidence presented
by the State did not justify the submission to the jury of the
theory based on subsection (c) of Section 76-5-203.

The

evidence did not disclose that the Appellant created a grave
risk of death to any person other than the victim or that the
Appellant acted with depraved indifferance

to human life.
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(

The erroneous instruction prejudicially and materially
affected the Appellant's right to a fair trial and
the conviction should be reversed and a new trial granted.
III.
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO THE TRIAL COURT WAS
INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A CONVICTION OF SECOND DEGREE
MURDER.
The Appellant submits that the evidence presented
was not sufficient to justify the verdict of the jury on the
grounds of second degree^iurder and that as a matter of law the crime
of second degree murder should not have been submitted to the
jury.

The attorney for the Appellant at the close of the

State's case made a Motion to Dismiss for failure to prove a
prima-facie case with respect to second degree murder. (T(2)78)
The Appellant respectfully submits that the Trial
Court committed reversable errors in not granted the Appellant's
motion.
DATED this

1st

day of

Oc/tbber

, 1976.

Respectful&v* Sublet tec^f

/JIM,

,,

Attorneys for Appellant
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